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HOW TO GET AWAY WITH MURDER: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
IMMUNITY PROVISIONS IN “STAND YOUR GROUND”
LEGISLATION
Jennifer Randolph*

I. INTRODUCTION
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on February 26, 2012, neighborhood
watch leader George Zimmerman shot and killed seventeen-year-old
1
Trayvon Martin in an Orlando-area neighborhood. While the events
that triggered the shooting are clouded in controversy, it remains uncontested that Martin was unarmed and on his return from the local
2
convenience store. Though Zimmerman admitted to firing the shot
3
that killed Martin, he asserted that it was done in self-defense. Authorities did not arrest or charge Zimmerman immediately after the
* J.D. Candidate, 2014 Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2011 The College
of New Jersey. Special thanks to Professor John Kip Cornwell for his guidance
throughout the writing of this Comment.
1
Julia Dahl, The Trayvon Martin Case Exposes the Realities of a New Generation of
Self-Defense Laws, CBSNEWS (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com
/8301-504083_162-57398005-504083/the-trayvon-martin-case-exposes-the-realities-ofa-new-generation-of-self-defense-laws/.
2
Id. The facts surrounding the incident are not completely clear. Zimmerman
called 911 to report a “real suspicious black guy” in the neighborhood. Though the
dispatcher told Zimmerman not to chase after Martin, Zimmerman followed the seventeen-year-old boy and an altercation ensued. Zimmerman states that Martin
knocked him to the ground with a punch to the nose, smashed his head into the
ground, and attempted to take his gun. On April 11, 2012, the prosecutor charged
Zimmerman with second-degree murder and a lesser offense of manslaughter. See
The Trayvon Martin Case: A Timeline, THE WEEK (July 17, 2012),
http://theweek.com/article/index/226211/the-trayvon-martin-case-a-timeline
[hereinafter Timeline]. Zimmerman chose not to assert immunity under Florida law
but, instead, to rely on the affirmative defense of self-defense. Seni Tienabeso &
Matt Guttman, George Zimmerman’s Decision Leads to Summer Trial, ABCNEWS (Apr. 30,
2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmerman-waives-stand-groundhearing-heads-trial/story?id=19074241. Following a jury trial, Zimmerman was acquitted. Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin
Killing,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
13,
2013,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-trayvonmartin.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
3
Dahl, supra note 1.
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4

incident. In the months that followed, the case gained national at5
tention and placed Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law under scrutiny.
In particular, the initial decision by police not to arrest Zim6
merman sparked protest from both the public and the Martin fami7
ly. Sanford Police Chief Bill Lee stated in a press conference on
March 12, 2012: “[i]n this case Mr. Zimmerman has made the statement of self-defense . . . . Until we can establish probable cause to
8
dispute that, we don’t have the grounds to arrest him.” This statement reflects the implications of an immunity provision passed in
9
2005 as a part of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law. Since 2005,
upwards of twenty states have passed similar “Stand Your Ground”
statutes containing provisions for criminal immunity, civil immunity,
10
or both, for persons “justified” in using force.
4

Id.
In April of 2012 30% of Americans indicated they were following the Trayvon
Martin case more than any other story. Timeline, supra note 2.
6
See Patrik Jonsson, Trayvon Martin Case Reveals Confusion Over How Stand Your
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Apr.
11,
2012),
Ground
Works,
THE
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2012/0411/Trayvon-Martin-case-revealsconfusion-over-how-Stand-Your-Ground-works.
7
See Timeline, supra note 2.
8
See Dahl, supra note 1. The police chief later stepped down following a “vote
of no-confidence from the city.” Cora Currier, The 24 States That Have Sweeping Self(Mar.
22,
2012),
Defense
Laws
Just
Like
Florida’s,
PROPUBLICA
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-23-states-that-have-sweeping-self-defense-lawsjust-like-floridas.
9
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2013).
10
See Wyatt Holliday, Comment, “The Answer to Criminal Aggression is Retaliation”:
Stand Your Ground Laws and the Liberalization of Self-Defense, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 407, 407
(2012); P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground, 35 S.U.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2007); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d) (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
09.65.330 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6808 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
503.085 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2922b (West 2012); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15(5)(b) (West 2012); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 563.074 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-51.2(e) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1289.25 (West 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.2 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-11-450 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 895.62(2) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 2012). Though
additional states have amended their self-defense statutes to reflect traditional aspects of “Stand Your Ground” legislation, the previous list reflects those that have
added some form of immunity provision since the enactment of the Florida statute in
2005. The specific aspects of these state laws will be discussed in the sections that fol5
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This Comment does not begin with the story of Trayvon Martin
to incite discussion on the outcome of the case, or to proffer an opinion regarding the veracity of Zimmerman’s defense, but to serve as an
instructive starting point for demonstrating the harmful effects of
one type of immunity now accorded to many defendants asserting a
claim of self-defense. A typical “Stand Your Ground” law is a doctrine
of self-defense that allows a person to meet force, including deadly
11
force, with corresponding force. These laws traditionally eliminate
any existing duty to retreat and provide for some form of criminal or
12
tort immunity. They are premised on, and justified by, the idea that
law-abiding citizens should be permitted to “protect themselves, their
families, and others from intruders and attackers without fear of
prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of themselves and
13
others.” The goals of this Comment are to explore the various types
of immunity granted by recent “Stand Your Ground” laws, to highlight the problematic aspects of these provisions, and to recommend
changes for these statutes.
Part II of this Comment provides a background to self-defense
law and examples of how previous immunity provisions functioned.
Part III discusses the new “Stand Your Ground” laws and how the addition of civil and criminal immunity changed traditional self-defense
procedures and law. Part IV focuses on laws granting criminal immunity and highlights problematic aspects of their implementation.
Part V focuses on statutes granting civil immunity and their possible
implications. Then, Part VI recommends changes to these statutes.
Part VII concludes.

low.
11

See generally Andrea A. Amoa, Note and Comment, Texas Issues a Formidable License to Kill: A Critical Analysis of the Joe Horn Shootings and the Castle Doctrine, 33 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2008) (describing Texas’ “Stand Your Ground” law);
Jason W. Bobo, Comment, Following the Trend: Alabama Abandons the Duty to Retreat and
Encourages Citizens to Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 361–63 (2008) (describing Alabama’s “Stand Your Ground” law); Holliday, supra note 10, at 425–28,
431–33 (describing Ohio’s and Wisconsin’s “Stand Your Ground” laws); Judith
Koons, Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors: Women Surviving Intimate Battery and Deadly Legal
Doctrines, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 617, 618 n.3 (2006) (describing Florida’s “Stand Your
Ground” law).
12
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).
13
See Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (quoting the preamble to §
776.032 of the Florida statutes); David Kopel, Florida’s New Self Defense Law, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 19, 2005, 11:24 AM), http://www.volokh.com/posts
/1116516262.shtml.
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II. SELF-DEFENSE AND IMMUNITY PROVISIONS BEFORE 2005
A. Self-Defense: Substance, Procedure, and Theory
An American court considered one of the first self-defense cases
14
in 1806. In Commonwealth v. Selfridge, the defendant, Selfridge, was
charged with manslaughter for the death of Charles Austin, a young
15
Harvard student. In his jury instruction, Judge Parker articulated
the basic concept of self-defense: “[w]hen . . . there is reasonable
ground to believe that there is a design to destroy his life . . . then
killing the assailant will be excusable . . . although it should after16
wards appear that no felony was intended . . . .” Judge Parker went
on to proffer a hypothetical in which the defendant (“A”) is faced
17
with an opponent/victim waving a gun. In the hypothetical, the defendant kills the victim only to later find out that the gun contained
18
blanks instead of bullets. Judge Parker questioned: “[w]ill any reasonable man say that A is more criminal than he would have been if
19
there had been a bullet in the pistol?” Though both the instruction
and the hypothetical offered by Judge Parker have been criticized as
20
“off-point” in the context of the Selfridge fact-pattern, the ideas rep21
resented by this decision remain a part of American self-defense law.
Today, “[e]very state in the United States recognizes a defense for the
22
use of force, including deadly force, in self-protection.”
Traditionally, a person is justified in his or her use of force if he

14

Ross, supra note 10, at 6.
Id. Selfridge, a lawyer and aspiring politician, had squabbled with the victim’s
father, Benjamin Austin, over the posting of slanderous comments about him in the
local newspaper. Id. Following these comments, the situation intensified and
Selfridge armed himself. Id. Selfridge met with the younger Austin on the street; an
altercation ensued resulting in the death of Charles Austin by the gun of Selfridge.
Id. at 7.
16
Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II-Honest But Unreasonable Mistake of
Fact in Self-Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 477 (1987).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Singer opines that because Selfridge’s indictment was for manslaughter, not
murder, and his shot was unlikely to have been the result of a “mistake” as to the
amount of force necessary, the fact-pattern of Selfridge is not ideal for a discussion of
self-defense. See id.
21
See State v. Light, 664 S.E.2d 465, 469 (S.C. 2008) (holding that a defendant
was entitled to an instruction of self-defense when he was approached with a firearm); Koritta v. State, 438 S.E.2d 68, 69–70 (Ga. 1994) (holding that the defendant
was entitled to a self-defense instruction in an altercation involving a gun).
22
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 223 (5th ed. 2009).
15

RANDOLPH (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/9/2014 2:38 PM

COMMENT

603

or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent the im23
minent use of unlawful force against him or her by another. With
this standard, a person need not experience actual harm so long as
24
he possesses a reasonable belief that such harm is imminent. Deadly
force is permitted only in situations where the actor has a reasonable
25
belief that he is facing the imminent use of unlawful deadly force. In
both instances, the defense is qualified by a requirement that the person asserting the defense be a “non-aggressor” in the altercation that
26
gave rise to the use of force.
For the most part, there was no substantive difference between
the assertion of self-defense in a criminal matter and a civil or tort
27
matter. In either context, a claim of self-defense is generally raised
28
as an affirmative defense. The most critical procedural difference is
29
in the allocations of burdens in either situation. In a criminal matter, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant’s
30
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and states differ on the burden of
proof that is placed on the defendant with respect to an affirmative

23

Id.
See Lydia Zbrzeznj, Note, Florida’s Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting
Citizens to Arm Themselves and Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13 F.
COASTAL. L. REV. 231, 233 (2012).
25
DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 223.
26
Id. at 226 (defining aggressor as “one who threatens unlawfully to commit a
battery upon another or who provokes a physical conflict by words or actions calculated to bring about an assault”).
27
Caroline Forell, Symposium, Who is the Reasonable Person? What’s Reasonable?:
Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1403
(2010); see also Privileged Use of Force in Self-Defense, 33 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 1
(2012) [hereinafter Privileged Use of Force] (“There are few, if any, substantive distinctions between civil and criminal law with regard to the prerequisites to justification of
a claim of self-defense, and, with the exception of the rule of evidence which gives to
a person accused of a crime the benefit of a reasonable doubt the law of self-defense
is the same in both criminal and civil cases.”); infra text accompanying notes 47•67
(describing the substance of self-defense law).
28
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1416 (West 2012). In subsection (1) of the
statute it provides that “[i]n any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable
under sections 28-1406 to 28-1416, justification is an affirmative defense.” Id. at § 281416(1). In subsection (2) of the statute, it acknowledges the same range of sections
and provides that they serve as an affirmative defense to a civil action as well. Id. at §
28-1416(2). Within the range of applicable sections is the justification for the use of
force. See id. at § 28-1409.
29
See Privileged Use of Force, supra note 27, at § 1.
30
See id. at § 7; Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989) (“In the criminal trial setting, the presumption of innocence is given vitality primarily through the requirement that the government prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
24
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31

defense. Comparatively, in a civil matter, the burden of both pleading and proving self-defense is on the defendant who seeks to justify
32
his or her actions. Defendant must prove this by a preponderance
33
of the evidence. No matter with whom the burden lies in various
states, however, the ultimate decision rests in the hands of the judge
34
or jury deciding the matter at trial.
The recognition of self-defense as an affirmative defense rests on
the premise that certain actions are “justified” by their circumstanc35
es. “Justification” defenses typically provide protection for actions
36
that are considered warranted by the situation. For example, a driver of a fire engine may speed en route to an emergency in violation
of local traffic laws, but the driver’s behavior would be considered
warranted, because the risk of harm associated with the fire is greater
37
than the traffic risk created by the truck’s speed. Members of society would not only accept the fire engine driver’s actions, but they
would hope that similarly situated fire engine drivers would take the
38
same action.
By contrast, defenses such as insanity are considered “excuse”
39
defenses. “Excuse” defenses relieve the individual actor of blame
for their actions even if the same actions would not be excused for
40
other persons. For example, an employee experiencing extreme
mental and emotional issues who flies into a fit of rage and hits a coworker may be wholly or partially excused from liability because of his
31

See Privileged Use of Force, supra note 27, at § 7. In some states, the defendant is
required to prove that he acted in self-defense “either by a preponderance of the evidence, by the greater weight of the evidence, by convincing evidence, by proof to
the satisfaction of the jury, or by proof raising a reasonable doubt.” Id. Other states
leave the burden on the prosecutor to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant was not acting in self-defense. Id. States may also require that the defendant produce evidence that he or she acted in self-defense and leave the burden
of persuasion on the prosecution. Id.
32
Id. at § 8.
33
Id.
34
Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Elizabeth Cateforis, Self-Defense, What’s a Jury Got To Do
With It?, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (2009). This is one aspect of self-defense law
that is altered significantly by the new legislation. See infra Part III.
35
See Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 387, 388–89
(2005); Zbrzeznj, supra note 24, at 234.
36
Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1897, 1900 (1984).
37
Id. at 1899.
38
Id.
39
Baron, supra note 35, at 388–89 (noting also that “some defenses are difficult
to classify”).
40
Greenawalt, supra note 36, at 1900.
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41

or her diminished mental state. The same attack by any other per42
son, however, would not receive protection.
This categorization not only draws distinction by title, it reflects
43
a distinction in moral principles as well.
[T]o say that an action is justified is to say . . . that though
the action is of a type that is usually wrong, in these circumstances it was not wrong. To say that an action is excused,
by contrast, is to say that it was indeed wrong . . . but the
44
agent is not blameworthy.
Taking this one step further, one scholar opines that the policy justifying self-defense is the very same that underlies the creation of the
crimes to which it serves as a defense—offenses against the person
45
such as murder, battery, or rape. Specifically, it is the societal interest in life and bodily integrity that is paramount to the justification of
self-defense and to the creation of crimes which intend to prohibit
46
harmful use of force. Unfortunately, new “Stand Your Ground” laws
that permit complete immunity from criminal or civil action diminish
this respect for human life.
B. Self-Defense: Deadly Force and the Duty to Retreat
Recognizing the value of human life, English common law embraced a duty to retreat “as far as he conveniently or safely can” when
47
in the face of deadly force. This duty reflected a historical reluctance to legitimize the right of self-defense when it involved defensive
48
killing. An exception to the duty to retreat existed, however, when a
49
man was attacked in his own home. Reflecting the conviction that
“a man’s home is his castle,” this exception became known as the Cas50
tle Doctrine. Therefore, a man faced with deadly force in his own
home had no duty to retreat to safety before responding with force,
41

Id. at 1899–1900.
Id. at 1900.
43
Baron, supra note 35, at 389. Baron acknowledges that most persons would
prefer to have an action deemed justified versus excused. Id.
44
See id. at 388–90.
45
Janine Young Kim, Rule and Exception in Criminal Law (Or, Are Criminal Defenses
Necessary?), 82 TUL. L. REV. 247, 278 (2007).
46
Id.
47
See Bobo, supra note 11, at 362; Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?:
Reexamining Castle Doctrine Statutes, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 528 (2010) (citing 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 423).
48
See Levin, supra note 47, at 528.
49
Id. at 530.
50
Id.
42
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51

including deadly force.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, there was a dramatic
movement in the United States to abandon the duty to retreat in the
52
face of deadly force. Resentment toward the duty to retreat grew as
a result of the view that to require such a duty was to require coward53
ice. Thus, a majority of modern American self-defense statutes utilize a “no retreat” rule that permits a non-aggressor to utilize deadly
force in the face of an unlawful deadly attack, even if retreat to safety
54
is possible. The minority of states that maintain the duty to retreat
in the face of deadly force, however, continue to embrace the English
55
common law Castle Doctrine exception. The Model Penal Code, for
example, states that an “actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed
in his place of work by another person whose place of work the actor
56
knows it to be.”
Abrogation of the duty to retreat began in the state supreme
57
courts. In Erwin v. State, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that a “true man” should not be required to retreat from an “assail58
ant, who . . . maliciously seeks to take his life.” Similarly, in Runyan
v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court found that the “American mind”
59
weighed against imposing a duty to retreat. The United States Supreme Court followed suit, essentially rejecting the duty to retreat in

51

Id.
Id. at 529.
53
Bobo, supra note 11, at 343; see also Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground:
Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 507
(2007) (“The American ideals of bravery and honor suited themselves to frontier life
in a way that the English duty to retreat could not.”).
54
See Bobo, supra note 11, at 343; DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 229.
55
DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 531; see also People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497
(N.Y. 1914) (“It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own
dwelling is bound to retreat.”); State v. Middleham, 17 N.W. 446, 448 (Iowa 1883)
(stating that there is no duty to retreat in one’s home).
56
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) (Official Draft 1985).
57
Bobo, supra note 11, at 344; see, e.g., Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877); Erwin
v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876).
58
Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 199. In Erwin, the defendant and his son-in-law were in a
dispute over the possession of a storage shed that was located in between their two
homes. The day that the homicide took place, Erwin was in the shed and his son-inlaw approached him with an ax in an apparently threatening manner. Erwin responded with a single shot that resulted in the death of his son-in-law. Id. at 192–93.
59
Runyan, 57 Ind. at 84. Runyan was convicted of manslaughter of Charles
Pressnal. The deceased hit him two or three times before Runyan pulled a pistol out
of his pocket and shot him. Id. at 81.
52
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60

the 1921 case Brown v. United States. In Brown, the defendant was
convicted of the murder of Hermis, a man who reportedly attacked
the defendant with a knife at the time that Brown fired the fatal
61
shot. Though it was requested by the defense, the lower court refused to give a jury instruction that retreat was unnecessary if the de62
fendant reasonably feared for his life. Instead, the court instructed
63
the jury that the defendant had a duty to retreat. The Supreme
64
Court granted certiorari and Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion
of the Court, stated:
Many respectable writers agree that if a man reasonably believes that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous
bodily harm from his assailant he may stand his ground and
that if he kills him he has not succeeded the bounds of lawful self-defense . . . Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife. Therefore in this
Court, at least, it is not a condition of immunity that one in
that situation should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with safety or to
65
disable his assailant rather than to kill him.
Justice Holmes’ opinion not only supports the abolition of the duty to
retreat in the face of deadly force in American jurisdictions, but it also highlights the beginnings of the ideas underlying “Stand Your
66
Ground” legislation. The use of the term “immunity” in this opin67
ion, however, does not reflect its use in the new legislation.

60

256 U.S. 335 (1921); see also Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 563–64
(1895) (holding that there is no duty to retreat when a person is on the premises of
his or her dwelling and faced with deadly force).
61
Brown, 256 U.S. at 341–42.
62
Id. at 342.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 341.
65
Id. at 343. (emphasis added). It is interesting to highlight within this description the use of “stand his ground” and “immunity.”
66
See generally Cantalfamo, supra note 53, at 510 (noting that an “increased understanding of human nature and the complex moral measurements required by the
duty to retreat” lead to the privilege of non-retreat and that this realization was evident in the Holmes opinion). The Brown decision serves as persuasive authority for
those states dealing with issues of the duty to retreat in self-defense law. See Bobo,
supra note 11, at 351. It follows that Brown also serves as some persuasive authority
for the “Stand Your Ground” laws.
67
See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the Florida law entitled a defendant to a pre-trial hearing regarding immunity from prosecution for lawful use of force, not merely an affirmative defense of self-defense at trial).
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C. Immunity: Public Officials and Self-Defense
Immunity, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is “any exemp68
tion from a duty, liability or service of process.” Traditionally, immunity for an individual defendant has been based upon his or her
69
status as a public official. The recent “Stand Your Ground” legislation, however, grants immunity to defendants who are justified in us70
ing force. To distinguish between the concept of an affirmative defense, like self-defense, and the concept of “immunity,” it is helpful to
examine the conceptual difference between a defense from liability
71
and a defense from suit. Affirmative defenses generally come in the
form of defenses from liability—a defendant admits to the elements
that comprise the claim but desires to “justify, excuse, or mitigate the
72
commission of the act.” By contrast, immunity, like that typically
granted to public officials, is designed to operate as a defense from

68

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 817 (9th ed. 2009).
See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (noting that legislators are privileged and immune from arrest or civil process while performing legislative duty); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 53 (discussing absolute and qualified prosecutorial immunity); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (permitting qualified immunity to shield government officials from actions under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known”). As noted by the Supreme Court in Pearson v. Callahan, doctrines such as “qualified immunity” are intended to protect public officers from distraction, harassment, and liability while requiring them to remain accountable for
the irresponsible exercise of power. 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); see also Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349 n.11 (2009) (recognizing that the doctrine of qualified immunity can shield officers from liability).
70
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.65.330 (West
2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 2012);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922b (West
2012); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-15 (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.074 (West
2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.2(e)
(West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (West 2012); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.2 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-450 (2012); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 83.001
(West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.62(2)
(West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 2012).
71
Qualified immunity, for example, is intended to operate before the merits of
the case are reached. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (acknowledging
that the purpose of qualified immunity is to “avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment”). Affirmative defenses, by contrast, are generally used to justify or excuse certain conduct. See supra text accompanying notes 35–39.
72
People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553, 555 (Colo. 2011).
69
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suit before the merits of a case are reached.
Public officials, such as police officers and prosecutors, are often
74
afforded a “qualified,” not complete, immunity for their actions.
The doctrine of qualified immunity grants protection to public officials from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
75
reasonable person would have known.” The doctrine exists to balance the public’s desire to hold officials accountable for their actions
and the officials’ desire to be shielded from liability when they per76
form their duties in a reasonable manner. Qualified immunity acts
77
as immunity from suit, not a defense to liability.
Though immunity provisions contained in, or related to, selfdefense laws are relatively new, they are not a completely novel concept. Prior to the outbreak in 2005 of “Stand Your Ground” legislation featuring immunity provisions or statutes, a Colorado statute
78
similarly granted immunity to persons defending their home. Enacted in 1985, Colorado statute section 18-1-704.5 provides immunity
from both civil and criminal prosecution to those utilizing force, in79
cluding deadly force, in the face of an unlawful intruder. The statute’s purpose, as evident in its text, is to recognize citizens’ “right to
80
expect absolute safety within their own homes.” This justification
81
bears striking similarity to the justification for the Castle Doctrine.
The Supreme Court of Colorado clarified, however, that this immunity is provided only when there is a known unlawful entry into the
82
home. This requirement for unlawful entry makes the Colorado
statute slightly more restrictive than the Castle Doctrine, which provides a defense for the use of force in one’s home qualified only by
83
the requirement that the individual is not the initial aggressor.
In 1987, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that the language of the statute provided for more than just an affirmative de73

Maia R. Albrecht, Comment, Defining Qualified Immunity: When is the Law
“Clearly Established?”, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 311, 318 (2001).
74
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
75
See id.
76
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
77
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
78
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704.5 (West 2013).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See supra text accompanying notes 50–57.
82
People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304, 313 (Colo. 1995).
83
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) (Official Draft 1985).

RANDOLPH (DO NOT DELETE)

610

4/9/2014 2:38 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:599

84

fense to liability. The court held that the statute created the need
for a pre-trial determination of a defendant’s immunity from prose85
cution. In rendering its decision, the court looked at both the plain
language of the statute, as well as the definition of immunity provided
by Black’s Law Dictionary, and determined that the statute rendered
86
any proceeding against an immune party improper. Procedurally,
this required a pre-trial hearing at which the defendant was required
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she was enti87
tled to immunity under the statute. The pre-trial hearing was to be
held contemporaneous with, or immediately following, the prelimi88
nary hearing in a criminal trial. Specifically, this required the defendant to prove:
(1) [A]nother person made an unlawful entry into the defendant’s dwelling; (2) the defendant had a reasonable belief that such other person had committed a crime in the
dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or was committing or intend[ing] to commit a crime against a person or
property in addition to the uninvited entry; (3) the defendant reasonably believed that such other person might use
physical force, no matter [how] slight, against any occupant
of the dwelling; and (4) the defendant used force against
the person who actually made the unlawful entry into the
89
dwelling.
A defendant availing himself or herself of the pre-trial immunity proceeding is not later precluded from the assertion of self-defense as an
90
affirmative defense at trial. Further, the decision by the court at the
91
pre-trial is not considered a “final judgment” subject to later appeal.
While the Colorado courts interpreted their statute to provide
for a pre-trial determination of immunity, other courts interpreting
similar language prior to 2005 declined to find an independent grant
84

People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 978 (Colo. 1987).
See id.
86
Id. at 975.
87
Id. at 980.
88
Id. at 978 n.5.
89
Guenther, 740 P.2d at 981; see also Robert Christian Rutledge, Vigilant or Vigilante? Procedure and Rationale for Immunity in Defense of Habitation and Defense of Property
Under the Official Code of Georgia Annotated §§ 16-3-23, -24, -24.1, and -24.2, 59 MERCER
L. REV. 629, 652 (2008).
90
See Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Colo. 2011); Montanez v. State, 24
So. 3d 799, 801 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that defendant would still be
permitted to assert self-defense even though he was denied immunity).
91
Wood, 255 P.3d at 1141.
85
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92

of immunity. Like Justice Holmes’s use of “immunity” in the Brown
93
decision, other states have interpreted their statutes to provide for
94
nothing more than the traditional affirmative defense. In Indiana,
for example, the self-defense statute provided that no person would
be placed in legal jeopardy for “protecting himself or his family by rea95
sonable means necessary.” The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the
contention that this statute required a pre-trial hearing to evaluate
the legitimacy of a self-defense claim before subjecting a person to
the “legal jeopardy” of a trial, holding instead that the language was a
96
mere reflection of public policy of the state. Similarly, in Arizona, a
statute originally enacted in 1970 stated: “[n]o person in this state
shall be subject to civil liability for engaging in conduct otherwise jus97
tified pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.” The statute was
challenged in Pfeil v. Smith, in which the defendant argued that her
acquittal for justified conduct in a criminal charge was sufficient, under section 13-413 of the Arizona Code, to acquit her of subsequent
98
civil charges filed. The court, however, held that the statute did
nothing more than to allow a person to assert the affirmative defense
99
of self-defense in a civil case.
III. THE CHANGE IN SELF-DEFENSE AND THE ADDITION OF IMMUNITY
While the previous section looked at traditional self-defense law
and immunity provisions, this section details how immunity provisions in “Stand Your Ground” laws have altered the “traditional” approach both substantively and procedurally. Substantively, the “Stand
Your Ground” laws have expanded state self-defense law by both removing the duty to retreat, in those states that had previously re100
tained it, while also adding a presumption of reasonable force when

92

See, e.g., Loza v. State, 325 N.E.2d 173, 176 (Ind. 1975); Pfeil v. Smith, 900 P.2d
12, 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
93
See supra text accompanying notes 63–65.
94
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-413 (2012).
95
See Loza, 325 N.E.2d at 176.
96
Id. The statute at issue in Loza has since been amended; however, the new legislation contains similar language. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(c)(2) (West 2012)
(“No person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for
protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.”).
97
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-413 (2012).
98
Pfeil v. Smith, 900 P.2d 12, 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
99
Id. at 15.
100
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2012). See generally text accompanying notes 115–121.
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101

the force is used in the home or car. Procedurally, the new “Stand
Your Ground” laws generally prohibit arrest without probable cause
102
that unlawful force was used, permit pre-trial immunity hearings for
103
persons asserting self-defense, and prevent remedies in the civil
104
courts when a person asserts statutory immunity.
A. Florida: Where it All Began
The movement towards broader self-defense legislation and im105
munity provisions began in Florida in 2005.
Conceived by former
National Rifle Association (NRA) President Marion P. Hammer, Florida’s Protection of Persons Bill passed unanimously in the Senate and
106
by overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives.
It was
107
promptly signed into law by Governor Jeb Bush on April 26, 2005,
108
and became effective October 1, 2005.
Prior to 2005, self-defense law in Florida combined statutory and
109
common law and included a duty to retreat.
The prior version of
Florida’s self-defense statute 776.012 permitted the use of force if the
defendant reasonably believed he or she faced imminent death or
110
great bodily harm.
Criminal prosecution prior to the new legislation permitted a person charged with a crime involving force, including homicide, to raise an affirmative defense of self-defense, but it did
111
not provide for a pre-trial determination of that defense. A prima

101

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2012). See generally text accompanying notes 115–121.
102
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).
103
See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29–30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
104
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622
(West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012).
105
Ross, supra note 10, at 18.
106
See Daniel Michael, Recent Development: Florida’s Protection of Persons Bill, 43
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 199, 199; Manuel Roig-Franzia, Florida Gun Law to Expand Leeway
for Self-Defense, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/25/AR2005042501553.html.
107
Zachary Weaver, Note, Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law: The Actual Effects and
the Need for Clarification, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 395 (2008).
108
See Michael, supra note 106, at 200.
109
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999).
110
Hernandez v. State, 842 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting
that Section 776.012 allows for the use of deadly force “only if he or she reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm
to himself or herself” and that “[w]hether a person was justified in using deadly force
is a question of fact for the jury to decide if the facts are disputed”).
111
See generally Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049 (articulating Florida self-defense law in
1999).
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facie case of self-defense under the old self-defense statute consisted
of: (1) a reasonable belief (2) that deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death (3) to himself or herself (4) or another (5) or
112
to prevent the imminent commission of a felony.
Once a defendant proved a prima facie case of self-defense, the burden shifted at
trial to the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the de113
fendant did not act in self-defense. The jury was left with the ultimate decision, to determine whether the defendant subjectively held
114
a belief and whether such a belief was objectively reasonable.
The 2005 “Stand Your Ground” law substantially amended Flori115
da’s pre-existing statutes by eliminating the duty to retreat, establishing a presumption that force was used reasonably where a defendant was faced with an unlawful intruder in the home or occupied
116
vehicle, and expanding the right of an individual to use force, including deadly force, without the possibility of criminal or civil con117
sequences. With respect to this last aspect, immunity, the law stated: “A person who uses force as permitted in § 776.012, § 776.013,
or § 776.031 is justified in using such force and is immune from crim118
inal prosecution and civil action . . . .” It further defined the term
criminal prosecution to include “arresting, detaining in custody, and
119
charging or prosecuting the defendant.”
Most provocatively, the new law prohibits arrest until there is
probable cause to support the belief that the use of force was unlaw120
ful. In describing the dramatic change to self-defense law, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State stated:

112

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2004).
Rasley v. State, 878 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
114
Quaggin v. State, 752 So. 2d 19, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
115
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2012).
116
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013 (West 2012).
117
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012).
118
Id.; see also id. at § 776.012 (Use of force in defense of person); id. at § 776.013
(Home protection; use of deadly force; presumption of fear of death or great bodily
harm); id. at § 776.031 (Use of force in defense of others).
119
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).
120
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012) (“A law enforcement agency may
use standard procedures for investigating the use of force as described in subsection
(1), but the agency may not arrest the person for using force unless it determines
that there is probable cause that the force that was used is unlawful.”). Thus, ruling
out self-defense becomes part of the statutory requirement for a law enforcement
officer to sign a complaint. See Bartlett v. State, 993 So. 2d 157, 159–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009).
113
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While Florida law has long recognized that a defendant may
argue as an affirmative defense at trial that his or her use of
force was legally justified, section 776.032 contemplates that
a defendant who establishes entitlement to the statutory
immunity will not be subjected to trial . . . . The statute does
not merely provide that a defendant cannot be convicted as
121
a result of legally justified force.
The Florida legislature was the first to pass a comprehensive update of its self-defense law pursuant to NRA lobbying, but it was most
122
certainly not the last. Due to the success of the legislation in Florida, the NRA increased its efforts to have similar legislation passed
123
across the country.
Since 2005, more than half of the states have
124
This
enacted or considered similar legislation to Florida’s statute.
Comment specifically focuses on those statutes containing provisions
granting the accused immunity from civil and/or criminal liability for
justified use of force.
B. Criminal and Civil Immunity: Florida and its Followers
At least five states have enacted statutes that include immunity
provisions with the same language as Florida, including: Alabama,
125
Kansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. Although North
Carolina enacted a statute containing substantially similar language
to Florida’s legislation, it does not specifically prohibit an officer
from arresting an individual without probable cause that the force
126
used was unlawful. All of these statutes, however, broadly immunize
127
In addition,
a defendant from both criminal and civil liability.
121

Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010).
Ross, supra note 10, at 16–17.
123
Michelle Jaffe, Up in Arms Over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law, 30 NOVA
L. REV. 155, 178 (2005–2006) (“Because the law passed in Florida so emphatically,
the NRA plans to ride their ‘big tailwind’ and get similar laws passed across the nation.”). NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre stated that this was the “first
step of a multi-state strategy.” Roig-Franzia, supra note 106. He stated further, “we
start with the red and move to the blue.” Michelle Cottle, Shoot First, Regret Legislation
Later, TIME, May 1, 2005, at 80, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine
/article/0,9171,1056283-1,00.html.
124
See Ross, supra note 10, at 2.
125
See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d)-(e) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West
2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.2(e)
(West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11450 (2012).
126
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(e) (2011).
127
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d)-(e) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (West
2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25
(West 2012).
122
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though other states have adopted statutes with different language,
128
their effects will likely be similar. For example, a statute enacted in
Georgia provides that a person “shall be immune from criminal prosecution” for lawful use of force, but it does not provide the same im129
munity from civil liability.
Not all of these statutes have been interpreted by their respective
state courts; the supreme courts of at least three states have acknowledged, however, that the statute provides for a pre-trial immunity
130
hearing. For example, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State
held that the “plain language of section 776.032 grants defendants a
substantive right to assert immunity from prosecution and to avoid
131
being subjected to a trial.”
This right, though similar to the pre132
trial immunity determination granted to residents of Colorado, is
potentially more encompassing as it applies to self-defense claims as
133
well as defenses of habitation.
The pre-trial determination of immunity affords a defendant a right that is substantially similar to the
one provided to public officials. It reflects the notion that any fur134
ther procedure against an “immune” party would be improper. Interestingly, Kansas has addressed the state’s immunity provision un135
der a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In McCracken v. Kohl, the
defendant alleged that he was immune from the underlying battery
136
prosecution and thus was unlawfully detained.
Though the court
rejected the defendant’s habeas petition, finding that his use of force
137
was unjustified, the defendant’s argument highlights the similarity
between this new construct of immunity and a defense to suit.
Since 2005, approximately thirteen states have enacted statutes
128

See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.65.330 (West 2012) (stating that a person is “not
liable for the death of or injury to” a person against whom they have utilized lawful
force); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2012) (immunizing a defendant from criminal prosecution for force used in self-defense and defense of habitation).
129
See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2012).
130
See Fair v. State, 664 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Ga. 2008); Rodgers v. Commonwealth,
285 S.W.3d 740, 755 (Ky. 2009); Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010).
131
Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 462.
132
See supra text accompanying notes 84–91.
133
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012). The “defense of habitation is primarily based on the protection of one’s dwelling or abode.” Catherine L. Carpenter,
Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 665
(2003). “[T]he defense provides that the use of deadly force may be justified to prevent the commission of a felony in one’s dwelling.” Id.
134
See supra text accompanying notes 68–77.
135
McCracken v. Kohl, 191 P.3d 313, 313 (Kan. 2008).
136
Id.
137
Id. at 319–20; see also supra text accompanying notes 23–26.
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providing for civil immunity for those who utilize force lawfully.
Though the language of these statutes is not entirely consistent, most
of these statutes exist as stand-alone grants of immunity from civil ac139
tion.
Idaho, for example, entitles its statute, section 6-808, “Civil
140
immunity for self-defense.” Similarly, Tennessee entitles its statute
141
“Use of force; civil immunity; costs and fees.” Texas simply entitles
142
its section 83.001 “Civil Immunity.”
These titles seem to reflect the notion that they provide some
form of immunity greater than the affirmative defense traditionally
offered defendants faced with claims of civil liability. Unfortunately,
judicial interpretation of the function of these statutes is limited.
Although it has yet to be conclusively decided by the courts, it seems
safe to assume that they function to prevent the assertion of claims
against a defendant justified in his or her use of force the same way
that immunity in the criminal setting protects a defendant from ar143
rest, detention, charging, and prosecution.
IV. PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF IMMUNITY IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT
In these new “Stand Your Ground” regimes, immunity from
criminal “prosecution” generally prohibits arresting, detaining,
144
charging, or prosecuting anyone falling under the statute’s shield.
Such a broad definition necessarily implicates the actions of government actors in all phases of the criminal justice process. This section
examines the law with respect to each aspect of the “prosecution”
from which a person becomes immune if they use force lawfully.

138

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2012);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922b (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(5)(b)
(West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.074 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a
(2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.2 (West 2012); TENN.
CODE. ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001
(West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.62(2)
(West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 2012). At the time of this writing, proposed legislation in New Hampshire seeks to remove the civil immunity provision
from the state statute. H.B. 135, 163rd Leg., Sess. of the Gen. Court (N.H. 2013).
139
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622
(West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012).
140
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012).
141
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012).
142
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012).
143
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012).
144
Id.
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A. Problems for Law Enforcement
The Florida statute and other similar laws include “arrest” and
“detaining in custody” in the definition of prosecution from which a
145
defendant is immune.
The statutes go further to specifically prohibit law enforcement from initiating an arrest until probable cause is
established that force was not used lawfully, that is, in self-defense,
146
defense of others, or defense of home. While probable cause is the
147
constitutional standard by which police effectuate a lawful arrest,
the law now requires that law enforcement obtain not only probable
cause that a crime has occurred, but also probable cause that refutes
148
the person’s probable affirmative defense.
Therefore, a law enforcement officer, in the earliest stages of criminal prosecution, is
tasked with evaluating the affirmative defense of the accused, on sce149
ne, if they desire to arrest the individual.
1. The Potential for Inconsistency and Abuse
Due to the lack of legislative clarity regarding the application of
the immunity statute, there is a great potential for inconsistent appli150
cation and possible abuse of this statute by law enforcement. Notably, the law received significant opposition from the law enforcement
151
community prior to its original passage in Florida.
Several urban
police chiefs spoke out against the law, calling it “unnecessary and
152
dangerous” and publicly opposing its passage.
145

Id. The Oklahoma statute, however, includes only charging and prosecuting in
the definition of “criminal prosecution.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25F (West
2012). Interestingly, it does include the same requirement that a law enforcement
agency refrain from arrest until it determines that probable cause exists to prove the
force used was unlawful. See id. at § 1289.25G.
146
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).
147
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause”); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (stating that, in the absence
of a search warrant, “[w]hether [an] arrest [is] constitutionally valid depends . . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officer[] had probable cause to
make it”).
148
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012) (Immunity from criminal prosecution
and civil action for justifiable use of force); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West
2012) (Use of force in defense of person).
149
See Elizabeth B. Megale, Deadly Combinations: How Self-Defense Laws Pairing Immunity with a Presumption of Fear Allow Criminals to “Get Away with Murder,” 34 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 105, 130 (2010).
150
Id. at 119.
151
See Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly Force in Self-Defense,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/27
/national/27shoot.html?_r=0.
152
Id.
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With respect to its application, no statute provides clear instructions as to the required procedures. Section two of the Florida self153
defense law, for example, permits law enforcement to use “standard
procedures for investigating” to determine the existence of probable
154
cause; however, it does not clearly establish what those procedures
155
entail for law enforcement agencies across the state. The Eleventh
Circuit in Reagan v. Mallory recognized this lack of clarity stating,
“[u]nder Florida law, law enforcement officers have a duty to assess
the validity of this defense, but they are provided minimal, if any,
156
guidance on how to make this assessment.”
While it may be true
that law enforcement agencies receive training in arrest procedures,
the statute now requires them to evaluate more than just the exist157
ence of a crime.
They are charged with both understanding the
self-defense law and evaluating whether there is probable cause to be158
lieve that such a defense would fail. Law enforcement officers are
159
not trained in this type of legal analysis.
Complicating the decision further is the requirement that the
160
officer prove a negative.
The statute requires that police officers
161
ascertain probable cause that “the force that was used is unlawful.”
Therefore, not only must an officer have an understanding of the
reasonableness and proportionality requirements that render use of
153

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012). In the Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky,
Oklahoma, and South Carolina statutes, this same language is reflected in the following subsections: ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(e) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231(b) (West
2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085(2) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1289.25G (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-450(B) (2006).
154
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).
155
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012); see also Patricia Wallace, Stand Your
Ground: New Challenges for Forensic Psychologists, 2006 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 37, 39
(noting that law enforcement agencies are trained to handle crime scenes but not
necessarily trained to evaluate reasonableness with respect to reasonable use of force
and deadly force).
156
Reagan v. Mallory, 429 Fed. App’x 918, 920 (11th Cir. 2011). The circuit
court reversed the district court finding that a reasonable officer could not have
thought there was probable cause to establish a crime of aggravated assault and
granted the officer qualified immunity. Id. at 922.
157
See FLA STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012); see also Wallace, supra note 155, at
39.
158
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).
159
STEVEN JANSEN & M. ELAINE NUGENT-BORAKOVE, EXPANSIONS TO THE CASTLE
DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 9 (2007), available at
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Castle%20Doctrine.pdf (noting that the attitude of a law
enforcement officer might affect their performance).
160
See id.; Weaver, supra note 107, at 419.
161
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).
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force “unlawful,” but they must also have evidence supporting the absence of lawful use of force before they arrest. Without probable cause
proving that negative, law enforcement is prohibited from arrest162
ing.
Inconsistency is already evidenced by the incongruent treatment
of factually similar cases in the state of Florida. While there is no relevant tracking system of law enforcement decision-making in self163
defense cases, much of the information demonstrating the effects
of immunity from arrest can be deduced from the media. Incidents
that took place after the enactment of the “Stand Your Ground” law
provide some insight as to the impact of placing an immunity decision on law enforcement. The case that has gained the most significant media attention is the aforementioned Trayvon Martin case.
Seventeen-year old Trayvon Martin was fatally shot while returning
164
165
from the neighborhood convenience store. Martin was unarmed.
George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch leader, stated that he
166
shot the boy in self-defense, and he was not immediately arrested.
The local police chief reported that the delayed arrest was a result of
the absence of probable cause to believe that Zimmerman had used
167
force unlawfully under the Florida law.
The inconsistent application of the law is demonstrated by com168
paring Zimmerman’s situation to the plight of Jimmy Ray Hair. In
Hair v. State, Hair and the victim, Charles Harper, were engaged in a
169
verbal argument at a nightclub. As in the Trayvon Martin case, and
many self-defense cases, the facts that follow are somewhat disput170
ed.
Hair asserted that Harper reached into the vehicle in which
162

Id. at § 776.032(2). In Alabama, this prohibition led to a claim of false imprisonment against a law enforcement officer who detained a man alleging that he utilized force in self-defense. Skinner v. Bevans, 116 So. 3d 1147, 1155 (Ala. Civ. App.
2012). The court assumed the defendant’s arrest to have “been the result of an investigation that determined there was probable cause to believe” that the force used
was unlawful. Id.
163
Zbrzeznj, supra note 24, at 261. The State of Florida seems to acknowledge
the absence of this data. Florida proposed legislation that would require that law enforcement officers “collect, process, maintain, and disseminate information and data
on all incidents concerning the alleged justifiable use of force” in the state; the bill
died in the Senate in May of 2013. H.B. 331, 115th Leg., Regular Sess. (Fla. 2013).
164
Dahl, supra note 1.
165
Id.
166
Timeline, supra note 2.
167
Dahl, supra note 1.
168
Hair v. State, 17 So. 3d 804, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
169
Id. at 805.
170
Id.; see also Megale, supra note 149, at 105.
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Hair was a passenger, and the two began to struggle.
Hair then
172
pulled out his gun and fired a shot at Harper. The police not only
arrested Hair, but he sat for two years in jail awaiting a trial on a
charge of first degree murder before eventually being granted im173
munity under Florida statute 776.032.
This lack of clarity could even lead to abuse, whether intentional
174
or unintentional, by law enforcement. Officers draw their own subjective conclusions from a situation. If, for example, an officer feels
that the individual “victim” in an altercation where the self-defense is
invoked “deserved” what was coming to him, the officer may decline
175
to arrest or to thoroughly investigate the incident. Normally, an officer would be required to arrest if probable cause exists that the
crime occurred, regardless of the officer’s subjective assessment of
the situation, and the existence of a victim would likely permit him or
176
her to effectuate that arrest. With immunity, however, a single officer has the ability to decline to arrest, and this decision could potentially be influenced by his or her own subjective assessment of the
177
situation. By contrast, if the issue of self-defense were to reach trial,
the persuasiveness of the perpetrator’s claim of self-defense would be
178
179
assessed by a jury comprised of a cross-section of the community.
Thus, ostensibly permitting a single officer to render a decision regarding a potential defendant’s immunity detracts from the benefits
171

Hair, 17 So. 3d at 805.
Id.
173
Megale, supra note 149, at 105.
174
See id. at 107–08.
175
See id. at 108.
176
See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[A] warrantless arrest by a
law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable
cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”); United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175 (1949).
177
Trish Oberweis & Michael Musheno, Policing Identities: Cop Decision-Making and
the Constitution of Citizens, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 903 (1999) (“In viewing police
stories from the perspective of identity, we suggest that what police think ought to be
done and what they do in particular situations depends, in part, on who is involved.”).
178
This assumes the right is not waived and that the crime at issue is of sufficient
gravity to trigger the right. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III’s
Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 373, 376 (2012) (describing the exceptions to the constitutional requirement
for a trial by jury in criminal cases).
179
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (“[S]election of a petit jury from
a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”).
172

RANDOLPH (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/9/2014 2:38 PM

COMMENT

621

of both the multiplicity and the diversity of the decision-maker that is
180
embodied in jury trials.
This possibility for abuse is highlighted in a story reported in
181
Clearwater, Florida. Kenneth Allen, a retired police officer, and his
neighbor, Jason Rosenbloom, argued on prior occasions due to Ros182
enbloom’s failure to follow local codes. On the day of the incident,
Rosenbloom visited Allen’s home and threatened to make his life
183
184
Allen closed the door and got a pistol from nearby.
miserable.
185
Rosenbloom refused to leave and began to rush into the house. Al186
Police never arrested Allen who claimed that he
len fired a shot.
was trying to stop a potential “home invasion” and to “keep his house
187
safe.”
Among the possible foundations for the decision not to arrest may be the fact Allen was a retired police officer. This type of inconsistency and abuse is severely problematic.
2. Law Enforcement as the Prosecutor, Judge, and Jury
In granting immunity from arrest and detention, Florida statute
section 776.032 and those with similar language make law enforcement personnel the initial arbiter in deciding whether a person is ex188
ercising a valid self-defense claim.
If a prosecutor decides not to
pursue the cases in which police decline to investigate, law enforcement officers become the ultimate decision-makers regarding wheth189
er or not a case is adjudicated. This effectively removes the deter190
mination of the perpetrator’s innocence or guilt from the court.
This was recognized by the Eleventh Circuit in Reagan v. Mallory,

180

Id. at 530 (“purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power”); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (noting that the “essential feature
of a jury obviously lies . . . in the community participation and shared responsibility
that results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
181
Ashlee Clark, Neighbor: Shooting in Defense of Himself, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 7,
2006),
http://www.sptimes.com/2006/06/07/Northpinellas
/Neighbor__Shooting_in.shtml.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Clark, supra note 181.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012); see also Megale, supra note 149, at
118–20.
189
See Megale, supra note 149, at 118–20.
190
See id.
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191

evaluating Florida’s self-defense law. The court stated that by defining criminal prosecution so broadly, “the statute ‘allows for an im192
munity determination at any stage of the proceeding.’” Therefore,
a decision by law enforcement at the earliest stage of the proceedings
bars potentially meritorious claims from evaluation by an objective
judge or jury.
Most concerning is that law enforcement must make this decision without the benefit of all of the evidence normally presented to
the trier of fact. In many of the situations in which law enforcement
officers must now apply the standard, all of the necessary evidence is
193
in the hands of the defendant. In the Trayvon Martin case, for example, the victim of deadly force was no longer available to give his
194
account of the altercation. The only remaining evidence with which
law enforcement could have established probable cause needed to
come from the very person asserting the defense, Zimmerman. It is
highly unlikely that Zimmerman would have said or done anything to
undermine his own asserted self-defense, and his Fifth Amendment
195
protection against self-incrimination allowed him to remain silent.
Therefore, arrest needed to wait. In fact, Zimmerman’s assertion of
self-defense was enough to prevent the police from arresting him for
196
several months. Even if witnesses were available to deliver their interpretation of the altercation, police were still required to assess the
reliability of an individual’s testimony or recounting of the events, a
197
role typically left to the jury or the trier of fact.
Further, during the time between the incident and the arrest, assuming the two are not contemporaneous because the police cannot
establish the requisite probable cause, the defendant would live

191

Reagan v. Mallory, 429 Fed. App’x 918 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 920 (quoting Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
(2009)).
193
Reagan, 429 Fed. App’x 918.
194
See supra text accompanying notes 2–4.
195
See B. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence from a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 597 (1970) (noting that
the Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling a defendant to act as a witness against
himself).
196
Though the incident occurred in February of 2012, Zimmerman was not
charged with a crime until April of that year. Timeline, supra note 2; see also text accompanying notes 1–8.
197
See Elaine D. Ingulli, Trial by Jury: Reflections on Witness Credibility, Expert Testimony, and Recantation, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 145, 145 (1986) (acknowledging that in a
trial by jury, the jury is the sole judge of witness credibility).
192

RANDOLPH (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/9/2014 2:38 PM

COMMENT

623

198

amongst the general population.
This seems contrary to the purported goal of the legislation to allow “law-abiding people to protect
199
Allowing the defendant to live free in society potenthemselves.”
tially places a law-breaking citizen in a position to threaten the life or
body of another law-abiding citizen. It also provides the defendant
with an opportunity for escape. The purpose of arrest, and subsequent detention, of an individual, is not only to prevent harm to the
community, but also to assure that the arrested individual is available
200
for later proceedings.
The Trayvon Martin case exemplifies the
possibility for escape. George Zimmerman’s whereabouts in the
201
weeks following the incident were reportedly unknown. The attorney representing Martin’s parents expressed concern that even if the
state of Florida decided to file charges against Zimmerman, he would
202
be unavailable to face them. He stated, “[w]e’re concerned that he
203
might be a flight risk, that nobody knows where he’s at.” While police indicated that they were in contact with Zimmerman, there was
204
speculation that Zimmerman had left the jurisdiction of Florida.
Police eventually charged and arrested Zimmerman on April 11,
205
2012, and a jury acquitted him on July 13, 2013.
B. Problems for Prosecutors and Judges
The states granting immunity in the criminal context provide
immunity not only from arrest but also from charging and prosecu-

198

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).
See Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (emphasis added).
200
See Robert Webster Oliver, Bail and the Concept of Preventative Detention, N.Y. ST.
B.J. 8 (1997) (noting that the New York bail law is focused on risk of flight).
201
Peter Grier, Suddenly Missing George Zimmerman Appears to Have Fled Florida,
ALASKA
DISPATCH
(Apr.
11,
2012),
http://www.alaskadispatch.com/print/article/suddenly-missing-george-zimmermanappears-have-fled-florida; Where is George Zimmerman?, CBSNEWS (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-57412307/where-is-george-zimmerman/ [hereinafter Where is George Zimmerman?].
202
Grier, supra note 201.
203
Where is George Zimmerman?, supra note 201.
204
Where is George Zimmerman?, supra note 201. Notably, Zimmerman’s attorneys
had discontinued representation “in large part because he was hiding and had
stopped responding to their calls.” Grier, supra note 201. Though his former attorneys indicated that they did not believe that Zimmerman intended to flee the country, they had no knowledge of his actual whereabouts. Id.
205
Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 2; Matt Gutman, Candace Smith & Pierre
Thomas, George Zimmerman Charged with 2nd Degree Murder in Trayvon Martin’s Death,
ABCWorldNews (Apr. 11, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/george-zimmermancharged-murder-trayvon-martin-killing/story?id=16115469.
199
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206

tion.
This grant of immunity necessarily implicates and alters the
207
role of prosecutors and judges in the criminal justice process. Because prosecutorial decisions are not subject to review by the court,
however, it would be difficult to identify precisely how a defendant’s
assertion of self-defense affected prosecutorial decision-making prior
208
to the enactment of such legislation. After its enactment, one prosecutor stated that “the real impact [of the law] has been that it’s making filing decisions for prosecutors. It’s causing cases to not be filed
209
at all or to be filed with reduced charges.” While this statement is
difficult to substantiate because statistics on the number of self210
defense claims made are unavailable, it demonstrates at the very
least that some prosecutors are concerned with the law’s effect on
charging decisions. In Duval County, Florida, the State Attorney indicated that the law has influenced the office’s decision to charge or
211
reduce charges in a handful of cases.
Specifically, he cited his office’s decision not to charge electronics store owner Doug Freeman
212
in the shooting of an unarmed man, Vince Hudson, in May of 2006.
State Attorney Harry Shorstein, though publicly siding with the
wounded individual, declined to prosecute stating that he did not be213
lieve he could get a conviction.
Similarly, Florida State Attorney
Andy Slater cited the “Stand Your Ground” law, as well as conflicting
witness testimony, as the reasons for offering a plea agreement to a
214
defendant that stabbed a man at a party.
With the imposition of pre-trial hearings on immunity, judges
215
face an additional task in the criminal justice process. For example,
206

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012).
See Weaver, supra note 107, at 406–07.
208
See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
1325, 1337 (1993).
209
J. Taylor Rushing, Deadly-Force Law Has an Effect, but Florida Hasn’t Become the
Wild West, FLA. TIMES-UNION (July 10, 2006), http://jacksonville.com/tuonline/stories/071006/met_22294481.shtml.
210
Weaver, supra note 107, at 407.
211
See id.
212
See Dana Treen, Shorstein Sides with Man Shot in Store, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jun.
21, 2006), http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/062106/met_22160331.shtml.
213
See id.
214
See Missy Diaz, Teenager Takes Plea Deal in Stabbing Case, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
Sept. 29, 2007, at 1B, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2007-0929/news/0709290006_1_plea-deal-slater-teenager.
215
See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (holding that § 776.032
entitles a defendant to a pre-trial determination of immunity). It should be noted
that not all “Stand Your Ground” statutes have thus far been interpreted to permit a
207
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the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State adopted the pre-trial
immunity procedure articulated by the First District Court of Appeals
216
The Peterson court largely followed the Colorado court
in Peterson.
in People v. Guenther and held that the defendant raising an immunity
claim has the burden of establishing the factual prerequisites by a
217
preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, a judge hearing a case
in which the defendant asserts immunity under the “Stand Your
Ground” legislation must evaluate the defendant’s immunity claim
utilizing a preponderance of the evidence standard prior to trial.
These additional hearings also constitute an addition to the judge’s
caseload that would not otherwise exist in a jurisdiction in which a
218
defendant may assert only an affirmative defense of self-defense. By
219
requiring additional hearings, these legislative hearings may undermine judicial economy.
V. THE PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF IMMUNITY IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT
An increasingly large number of states have established provisions to allow for a defendant’s immunity from civil liability if the de220
fendant used lawful force. Though there is not yet substantial judicial interpretation, a careful analysis reveals a number of potential
problems.
Specifically, the laws do not distinguish between liability for inju221
ry to the unlawful aggressor and liability for injury to a third party.
In fact, North Dakota is among the minority of these states that permits immunity from civil liability but recognizes an exception if a person “recklessly or negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to oth222
er persons.”
Such an individual would be liable “in a prosecution
223
In statutes that do not carve
for such recklessness or negligence.”
out this particular exception, a person justified in utilizing force may
224
not be held liable for injuries that result to a third party. This situapre-trial determination of immunity.
216
Id.
217
Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 29–30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
218
Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 462 (noting that Florida law does not recognize that a defendant may argue something more than affirmative defense).
219
See id.
220
See supra text accompanying notes 138–143.
221
See JANSEN, supra note 159, at 7.
222
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-01 (West 2011); see N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §
12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011) (North Dakota’s civil immunity statute).
223
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-01 (West 2011).
224
See JANSEN, supra note 159, at 6.
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tion is exemplified by an occurrence in Miami-Dade County, Florida
225
As a nine-year old girl sat outside her home playing with
in 2006.
her dolls, she was shot in the crossfire between two men, both of
226
whom asserted a claim of self-defense.
If both are successful in a
claim of immunity, this eliminates any legal remedy, either civil or
227
The Florida statute may justify a
criminal, for the innocent girl.
228
deadly defense, even if it was executed negligently or recklessly.
Though criminal and civil self-defense cases involving the same
defendant are rare, the availability of a civil remedy has afforded
some individuals or their families a remedy when the criminal justice
229
system did not.
The case of Bernhard Goetz is arguably the paradigmatic example of the use of self-defense by the same defendant in
230
both a criminal and civil trial. In Goetz, Bernhard Goetz boarded a
subway train at Fourteenth Street in Manhattan and sat down in the
231
same car as four youths. In his possession was an unlicensed .38 cal232
One of the youths approached Goetz and stated “give
iber pistol.
233
234
me five dollars.” None of the juveniles displayed a weapon. Goetz
235
responded by firing shots at each of the four boys. One youth was
struck in the chest, another in the back, the third in his left side, and
236
the fourth was initially unscathed. Goetz then turned to the fourth
237
youth and stated, “you seem to be all right, here’s another.”
He
238
fired a fifth bullet at the fourth youth, severing his spinal cord.
239
Goetz fled immediately following the incident. However, nine days
240
later Goetz surrendered himself to police. Goetz was eventually in225

See id.
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id. At the time of this writing, Florida has proposed legislation providing that
“immunity does not apply to injuries to children and bystanders who are not affiliated with an overt act.” H.B. 123, 115th Leg., Regular Sess. (Fla. 2013); see also S.B.
362, 115th Leg., Regular Sess. (Fla. 2013) (reflecting the same exclusion for children
and bystanders).
229
See Forell, supra note 27, at 1406.
230
Id. at 1407.
231
People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
232
Id. at 43.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id. at 43–44.
237
Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 44.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
226
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dicted for attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and
241
Goetz argued that his actions
criminal possession of a weapon.
242
were justified as self-defense. New York self-defense law at the time
of the incident justified the use of deadly force when a person “believed deadly force was necessary to avert the imminent use of deadly
force or the commission” of an enumerated felony and, if the District
Attorney did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she did
not have such beliefs, the jury would determine “if a reasonable per243
son could have had such beliefs.”
On June 16, 1986, a jury acquitted Goetz of attempted murder,
244
assault, and reckless endangerment. He was convicted only of one
count of illegal weapons possession, a felony that carries a maximum
245
penalty of seven years confinement.
Despite this acquittal, Goetz
246
Darryl Cabey, the fourth youth who
was later subject to civil suit.
suffered from a severed spinal cord as a result of the shooting, filed a
$50 million civil suit in the Bronx Supreme Court alleging that the
shots taken at his back were made “deliberately, willfully, and with
247
malice.” Cabey prevailed in this later civil suit in 1996, receiving a
248
With the enactment of provi$43 million judgment in his favor.
sions providing civil immunity, however, such civil suits may no longer be filed. This would result in the denial of a remedy to a person
who might otherwise receive an award of damages.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE NEED FOR CHANGE OR CLARIFICATION
The most effective avenue for change is to advocate for administrative alterations or amendments to the existing laws to promote
uniformity and to reduce the problematic application highlighted in
249
the previous sections.
The following discussion details those rec241

Id. at 45. There were a series of indictments and dismissals before these
charges were solidified. Id.
242
Id. at 46–50 (discussing New York self-defense law).
243
Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 52.
244
LILLIAN B. RUBIN, QUIET RAGE: BERNIE GOETZ IN A TIME OF MADNESS 257 (1986).
The media attention surrounding this event largely exalted Goetz as a hero who had
thwarted a mugging. Id. at 7. Even before Goetz had turned himself in as the gunman, there was a media “love affair” with him. Id. at 9.
245
Id. at 257. Goetz was ultimately sentenced to six months confinement, $5,000
fine, and five years of probation. Id. at 262.
246
See Forell, supra note 27, at 1407.
247
RUBIN, supra note 244, at 189.
248
Jonathan Markowitz, Bernhard Goetz and the Politics of Fear, in VIOLENCE AND THE
BODY: RACE, GENDER, AND THE STATE 209 (Arturo J. Aldama ed., 2003).
249
See supra Parts IV, V.
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ommendations.
A. Legislative Recommendation: The Florida Legislature Should Remove
“Arrest” and “Detaining in Custody” from the Definition of
Criminal Prosecution
The legislature should remove the immunity decision from the
purview of law enforcement decision-making by eliminating “arrest”
and “detaining in custody” from the definition of criminal prosecution in the statute. These are the areas in which the greatest poten250
tial implementation problems exist. Overall, the calculation of reasonable force should not be within the scope and duties of law
enforcement. Law enforcement training in arrest procedures does
not provide the necessary foundation for the complex legal analysis
251
associated with assessing an individual’s unlawful use of force. Further, placing this responsibility on the shoulders of law enforcement
makes them the initial, and possibly final, decision-maker though
they are not equipped with the same volume of evidence that may be
available later in the prosecution. This aspect of the immunity provision also runs the risk of allowing the subjective beliefs of an officer
to prevent the prosecution of a guilty party.
With these removed, criminal prosecution would include charg252
ing and prosecuting the defendant. This would place the decision
largely in the hand of the prosecutor and reduce the discretion of law
enforcement in arrest decisions to the more common requirement of
probable cause that the crime has occurred. Allowing “charging” and
“prosecution” to remain included in the definition of “criminal prosecution” does not carry the same inherent problems created by the
inclusion of “arrest” and “detention.” Providing immunity to criminal defendants simply adds to the considerations a prosecutor may
need to make in deciding whether to charge or with what crime to
charge a particular defendant.
The only other impact is the addition of a requirement for pretrial determinations of immunity, if the court interprets the statute to
253
function like the courts in Dennis v. State and People v. Guenther.
Though such proceedings alter the common notion of self-defense as
an affirmative defense asserted at trial, they seem to function like ad250

See supra Part IV.A.
See Wallace, supra note 155, at 39.
252
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012).
253
People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987); Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456
(Fla. 2010).
251
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ditional pre-trial summary judgment proceedings with likely insubstantial effect. This amendment would still allow the statute to protect the defendant from the fear of prosecution because charges
could be dismissed prior to trial. In this way, the defendant would
not be subject to complete criminal prosecution.
B. Administrative Recommendation: Alternatively, the State Should
Require Law Enforcement to Report Investigative Procedures
Regarding Self-Defense Claims
The law should require law enforcement to report the assertion
of self-defense claims in order to conduct an adequate assessment of
the effects of these laws, particularly the effects of the provision of
254
immunity from arrest.
Requiring law enforcement to track the
manner in which they investigate and to log the cases that they decline to arrest would provide greater clarity regarding the effects of
the law. Based upon the data collected, it may be possible to create a
uniform procedure for assessing probable cause in self-defense
claims. In order to create such a standard, law enforcement officers
must report all instances in which they decline to arrest based upon
their evaluation of probable cause in a case of self-defense. Law enforcement personnel should report to their own agency. The agency
would then compile the data across the state and evaluate it to examine the various practices of law enforcement and their differing interpretations of what the law requires of them. From this compilation the administration would need to create a usable standard for
law enforcement officers investigating assertions of self-defense.
In conjunction with a usable standard, all law enforcement officers must undergo additional training regarding the new self-defense
law. This training would provide greater knowledge of the intricacies
of the “Stand Your Ground” law to allow proper implementation. At
the moment, the confusion surrounding the law makes it difficult for
anyone to properly understand the situations in which the use of
force is, in fact, considered lawful and justified. Due to the enhanced
role of law enforcement officers under these statutes, their understanding of the law is imperative.
Further, the law should require prosecutors to report the cases
in which they decline to charge or reduce charges based primarily
upon the existence of the “Stand Your Ground” law. This would
permit a more thorough understanding of the actual effects that the
254

See supra text accompanying notes 163–164.
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law has on prosecutorial decision-making.
VII. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by highly-publicized cases, such as that of Trayvon
Martin, the inclusion of immunity from criminal and civil liability in
recent legislation has significant and potentially dangerous consequences. Particularly, the expansion of the role of law enforcement
in many recent statutes provides for both inconsistent application of
the statute and unwelcome results in its implementation. While our
criminal justice system seeks to promote justice, statutes making law
enforcement the initial arbiter of a person’s guilt thwart that end by
preventing a case from reaching its factual merits. Based upon this
assessment, law enforcement should be required to engage in uniform procedures or the law should be amended to remove law enforcement discretion in arrest. All states considering similar legislation should refrain from including “immunity from arrest” in the
statute’s construction.

